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~!!!~osophy
The article below originally appeared in Encyclopedia of
the American Constitution (1986), a four-volume work
edited by Leonard W. Levy (editor-in-chief), Kenneth L.
Karst (associate ed.) and Dennis]. Mahoney (assistant
ed.) . © 1986 by the Macmillan Publishing Company,
reprinted by permission.
In addition to Professor Regan, nine other members
of the U-M law faculty are listed as contributors to the
Encyclopedia: Francis A . Allen, Lee C. Bollinger,
Yale Kamisar, fames E. Krier, Joseph L. Sax, Frederick F.
Schauer, Theodore f. St. Antoine, Peter Westen and
fames Boyd White. Since writing their articles, Professors
Allen (University of Florida) and Sax (University of
California, Berkeley) have moved to warmer climates.
The Constitution is one of the great achievements
of political philosophy; and it may be the only political achievement of philosophy in our society . The
Framers of the Constitution and the leading participants in the debates on ratification shared a culture
more thoroughly than did any later American political elite. They shared a knowledge (often distorted,
but shared nevertheless) of ancient philosophy and
history, of English common law, of recent English
political theory, and of the European Enlightenment.
They were the American branch of the Enlightenment, and salient among their membership credentials was their belief that reasoned thought about
politics could guide them to ideal politica~ institutions for a free people . They argued pass10nately
about the nature of sovereignty, of political representation, of republicanism, of constitutionalism; and
major decisions in the ferment of institution-building
that culminated in 1787 were influenced/ if never
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wholly determined, by such arguments. The final
form of the new federal Constitution embodied
radically new views about the location of sovereignty
- now located "in the people" in a stronger sense
than any philosopher except Jean-Jacques Rousseau
would have recognized - and about the function of
the separation of powers and bicameralism.
Philosophy has never again played the role it played at the founding of the Republic, except perhaps
in inspiring some abolitionist constitutional theory.
To be sure, "philosophy" in a loose sense has always influenced politicians and judges, who are part
of society. The Supreme Court in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries expressed in its de-

cisions a laissez-faire "philosophy" compounded of
Darwinism, a version of natural rights theory, and
conservative economic beliefs. When the Court abandoned that "philosophy," they adopted another,
more progressivist and pragmatic, and more attuned
to, though at most only loosely connected with, the
renascent empiricism among academic philosophers .
Occasionally, the Court has adverted to specific
philosophical doctrines, from John Marshall in
Fletcher v. Peck (1810) to George H. Sutherland in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936)
(on the necessary existence of sovereign power) .
Individual justices like Oliver Wendell Holmes may
have been influenced by philosophical reading and
by contact with professional philosophers. But, on
the whole, while "philosophy" has had an influence,
philosophy has had little - except to the extent that
the "philosophy" of the present is always shaped in
part by the philosophy of the past. (The decreased
influence of philosophy has not lessened the relevance of philosophical issues.)
There are a number of reasons for the decreased
influence of philosophy. In the open society the
Framers helped to create, their style of argument,
dependent on a relatively homogeneous and classically educated elite, could not maintain its political
importance. Also, political philosophy itself became
less unified. Widely divergent views were united
under the umbrella of the Enlightenment by common opposition to hereditary privilege and hieratic
religion. Once common enemies were vanquished,
philosophical comrades parted company.
Another reason for the decreased influence of
philosophy is that philosophy admits of no binding
authorities, while law does, and does essentially.

The Framers were creating a new political system.
No one since then, except to some extent the
Reconstruction Congresses, has had that luxury.
Later contributors to our constitutional development
have always had to interpret, and to attempt
to maintain at least the appearance of continuity
with, what has gone before.
Curiously, while recent philosophical thinking has
had little discernible influence on constitutional law,
the reverse is not true. The decisions of the Warren
Court and the public discussion they generated
certainly contributed, probably significantly, to the
revival of interest among American philosophers in
social and political questions, a revival that became
apparent in the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s
and that is still in full flower.
Whatever the influence or lack of it of philosophy
on constitutional law, philosophical discussion
among academic constitutional lawyers may have
reached greater intensity in the 1980s than at any
time since the 1780s. Constitutional law, like law in
general, raises deep and perplexing philosophical
questions. The questions that arise most immediately
are questions of political philosophy, and of these
the one that has generated most discussion is
what is known as the "antimajoritarian difficulty" :
how can it be appropriate for the enormously consequential power of judicial review to be vested ultimately in nine individuals who are not chosen by
the people and who are not politically accountable to
anyone at all? The problem is especially vexing when
the Court, in the space of three decades, has outlawed segregation, forbidden religious activity in the
public schools, required reapportionment of the state
legislatures and local government, created a con33

stitutional code of criminal procedure, established a
right to abortion, and found in the equal protection
clause a command that government shall not engage
in se discrimination.
There are three principal types of answer to the
question how a democratic society can countenance
such judicial power. The first answer, and the natural answer for any lawyer, is the claim that the
Supreme Court has this power because the Constitution says it does . But the Constitution does not say
that, at least not explicitly. The power of judicial review is nowhere e plicitly granted. Now, in a sense,
the lawyer's answer is still right. The Constitution as
it has been interpreted from 1803 to the present does
create the power of judicial review . The propriety of
some form of judicial review is disputed by no one.
Even so, it is noteworthy that at the very foundation
of American constitutional law we encounter the
problem of constitutional interpretation.
Given a document, and given agreement that its
commands are to be put into practice by legal institutions, how do we decide what it commands?
How do we decide what it means? Neither the
words alone nor anything we know about the writers' intentions is likely to answer straightforwardly
all the questions time will bring forth. For that matter, is it the document we are primarily concerned to
interpret, or the political and doctrinal tradition proceeding from the document that we are concerned to
interpret and to continue? And how are interpretation and continuation related?
It is important to distinguish between the document and the tradition and to ask how our commitments to each are interrelated. For example,
we are firmly committed, by our allegiance to the
tradition, to certain doctrines, such as the effective
application of the Bill of Rights to the states and of
the equal protection clause to the federal government, which can be deduced from the document
only by extremely generous canons of interpretation.
Some argue that if we are committed to these doctrines, then we must accept and continue to apply
those generous canons. But that conclusion does not
follow at all . Law, like any tradition, can sanctify
mistakes .
The problem of interpretation does not arise only
at the stage of justifying judicial review. It arises also
at every application of judicial review. What is the
Court to do with this power? The lawyerly answer,
and again clearly the right answer in some sense,
is that the Court should enforce the Constitution.
But once more, how do we decide what the
Constitution means?
The lawyerly exponent of judicial review also
invites, by appealing to the Constitution, the most
fundamental question: why do we care about the
document or the tradition at all? It may be that to
ask this question is to go beyond the domain of the
lawyer as lawyer; but lawyers and judges are people,
and every person who bears allegiance to the docu34

any such answers will influence the course of constitutional law, remains to be seen. Hermeneutics
may bring new insight into the various meanings of
the idea of operating in a tradition. Barring some remarkable feat of philosophical bootstrapping, hermeneutics will not answer the most fundamental
philosophical question about constitutional law: why
care about the tradition at all? And there is a final
irony. Because the political community is made up
of individuals who must confront this fundamental
question, the community must confront it also,
even though from another perspective it is by
shared allegiance to the tradition that the community is defined. ~
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ment or the tradition must face this question. Note,
however: even though all lawyers and judges must
face this question of political philosophy in deciding
whether to carry out their roles, it does not follow
that they must also appeal to substantive political
philosophy in the course of carrying out their roles.
Whether they must do that, and whether they could
avoid doing that if they tried, are further issues.
The difficulties with the lawyerly justification and
exposition of judicial review have prompted two
other main theories of judicial review. In one theory,
judicial review is justified by the need to protect individual rights against infringement by majoritarian
government. Exponents of this theory have drawn
heavily on a neo-Kantian strain of contemporary
American political philosophy in attempting to elucidate individual rights and the limits of the majority's
legitimate power. In the other theory, judicial review
does not purport to limit but merely to purify the
democratic process. Judicial intervention is necessary
to protect political speech and participation and
to prevent distortion of the process by majority
prejudice, but all in the name of more perfect
majoritarianism.

Opposed as they are on the significance of individual rights, these two theories share an ambivalent relationship to the Constitution and the
interpretive tradition. Whence comes the notion that
individual autonomy should be protected, or that
majoritarian democracy should be purified but not
otherwise limited? Is it just that the Constitution
says so? The Constitution says neither of these
things explicitly; and it says both too much and too
little to make either of these views a completely
satisfactory reading of the document as a whole.
On the other hand, if someone claims to read the
Constitution as protecting individuality (or purified
majoritarianism) because of the independent moral
weight of those values, why does the historical document come into it at all? Is not every appeal to the
Constitution by a proponent of independently
grounded values of autonomy or purified majoritarianism in some sense mere manipulation of other
people's allegiance to the Constitution for itself?
We see that the questions raised by the lawyerly
approach to judicial review are not so easily avoided.
Still, the competing approaches we have noted alert
us to dimensions of the problem not previously apparent. First, if the justification for judicial review is
to promote general values such as autonomy or purified majoritariansim, that may help us decide how
specific bits of the Constitution should be interpreted. Second, the tradition may refer to certain
goals - justice, autonomy, democracy - which the
tradition itself views as having a value and grounding outside and independent of the tradition. If the
tradition commands allegiance both to its own specific content and to external values, it contains within itself the seeds of possible contradiction. What
does faithfulness to the tradition then require?
As of the 1980s, the newest philosophical interest
of academic constitutional lawyers is in hermeneutics. Whether there are answers here, and whether
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